

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KABUL 00537 01 OF 05 230544Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 PC-01 OMB-01 TRSE-00 SNM-02
EB-08 CU-02 /107 W
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 KABUL 537

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AF
SUBJ: YEAR-END AFGHAN EXTERNAL ASSESSMENT

1. SUMMARY: THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPECTACULAR OF 1976 WAS PAK-
AFGHAN RAPPROCHEMENT. IT WAS AN EVENT NO ONE WOULD HAVE DARED
PREDICT, YET INDICATIONS OF THIS DEVELOPMENT GO BACK AS FAR AS
THE PANJSHIR DISTURBANCES IN AFGHANISTAN DURING THE SUMMER OF
1975. PERHAPS EVENTS WILL GO FURTHER, AND LASTING COMMITMENTS
WILL BE MADE WHICH WILL BIND PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN IN
FRIENDSHIP AND COMMON PURPOSE. THERE ARE GOOD REASONS HOWEVER
WHY THIS MAY NOT HAPPEN, AND WHY MOMENTUM FOR FURTHER RAPPROCHE-
MENT MAY BE LOST. WE BELIEVE THIS SHOULD NOT CONCERN US
DEEPLY. ALREADY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN
STABILIZED AND MADE LESS LIKELY TO FLASH INTO CONFLICT, AND
THIS SATISFIES UNITED STATES INTEREST IN REGIONAL STABILITY.
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PAGE 02 KABUL 00537 01 OF 05 230544Z

1976 WAS AN IMPORTANT YEAR FOR THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND
AFGHANISTAN AFFIRMED ITS CONTINUING ADHERENCE TO THE NON-
ALIGNED CAUSE WHEN PRESIDENT DAOUD ATTENDED THE AUGUST SUMMIT
MEETING AT COLOMBO.

AFGHAN-SOVIET RELATIONS CONTINUED ON EVEN KEEL, BUT WE BELIEVE

THE USSR WAS DISCONCERTED BY PAK-AFGHAN RAPPROCHEMENT DESPITE OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY. SOME SOVIETS FEAR THAT A CONSEQUENCE OF FURTHER RAPPROCHEMENT WOULD BE DIMINISHED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. A SOLID AND LASTING STATE OF PAK-AFGHAN FRIENDSHIP WOULD HAVE REGIONAL STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE USSR.

1976 WAS A GOOD YEAR IN AFGHAN-U.S. RELATIONS, MARKED BY A VISIT TO WASHINGTON DURING JUNE OF PRESIDENT DAOUD'S SPECIAL ENVOY (AND BROTHER) MOHAMMAD NAIM, AND BY A VISIT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER TO KABUL AUGUST 8. PROGRESS WAS MADE IN AID AND PEACE CORPS COOPERATION WITH AFGHANISTAN AND AN IMPORTANT U.S./AFGHAN GOVT COMMERCIAL CONTRACT SIGNED. RESPONDING TO U.S. ENCOURAGEMENT, THE AFGHAN GOVT SHOWED INCREASED INTEREST IN NARCOTICS CONTROL.

PROGRESS IN AFGHAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS DURING 1976 WAS SLOWER THAN DURING THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS, AS THE BLOOM OF IRANIAN AID COMMITMENTS WORE OFF AND THE HARD FACTS OF CULTURAL DISAFFINITIES ASSERTED OR REASSERTED THEMSELVES. AFGHANISTAN ENJOYS GOOD RELATIONS WITH MOST OF ITS NEIGHBORS AND WITH MOST OF THE REST OF THE WORLD. AFGHANISTAN CAN CONTINUE TO DRAW FROM A RESERVOIR OF GENERAL GOODWILL TOWARD THIS NATION, MUCH OF WHICH IS TRANSLATED INTO AID COMMITMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS: THE DRAMATIC TURN-AROUND IN PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS IN MID-1976 WAS CLEARLY THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPECTACULAR OF THE YEAR.

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PAGE 03 KABUL 00537 01 OF 05 230544Z

THERE HAD EARLIER BEEN STRAWS IN THE WIND, SMALL SIGNS THAT PRESIDENT DAOUD MIGHT BE SOFTENING HIS POSITION ON PUSHTUNISTAN-BALUCHISTAN AND LOOKING TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS WITH BHUTTO'S PAKISTAN. THESE STRAWS BEGAN TO BLOW JUST AFTER THE PANJSHIR TROUBLES IN MID-SUMMER 1975 TAUGHT DAOUD THAT HIS REGIME TOO WAS VULNERABLE TO INSURRECTION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY DAOUD BELIEVED BHUTTO HAD INSTIGATED THE VIOLENCE, AND THIS CAME AS A SHOCK. INSTIGATING DISSIDENCE ACROSS A BORDER HAD EARLIER BEEN PERCEIVED AS UNIQUELY AN AFGHAN OPTION.

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PAGE 01 KABUL 00537 02 OF 05 230634Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
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USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 5 KABUL 537

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

THUS, AFGHANISTAN'S RESPONSE TO THE OCTOBER 1975 PAKISTANI SUPREME COURT DECISION TO UPHOLD A BAN ON PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY (A POLITICAL GROUP FOR WHICH AFGHANS HAVE CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY IN ADDITION TO HISTORIC TIES WITH ITS LEADERS) WAS RELATIVELY MILD. BHUTTO'S SUGGESTION OF THAT PERIOD THAT HE MIGHT VISIT AFGHANISTAN WAS NOT REJECTED OUT OF HAND, AND WHEN LATER IN 1975 PAKISTAN ACCUSED THE AFGHAN GOVT OF MOBILIZING ITS ARMED FORCES ALONG THE PAK BORDER THE AFGHAN REPLY WAS MEASURED AND NON-PROVOCATIVE. ON APRIL 6, 1976 AFGHANISTAN RESPONDED MILDLY TO A SPEECH THE PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER HAD MADE AT QUETTA BLASTING THE DAOUD REGIME, AND THE OFFICIAL AFGHAN STATEMENT REITERATED DAOUD'S WILLINGNESS FOR BHUTTO TO COME TO KABUL FOR DISCUSSIONS.

THESE EVENTS FAVORABLE TO RAPPROCHEMENT TOOK PLACE EVEN THOUGH THE PROPAGANDA LEVEL OF THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS HIGH AND ITS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KABUL 00537 02 OF 05 230634Z

TONE VICIOUS, AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT CONSULAR RELATIONS WERE STRAINED WITH NATIONALS OF ONE COUNTRY HARASSED DURING VISITS TO THE OTHER.

THE GREAT BREAKTHROUGH TOWARDS RAPPROCHEMENT CAME DURING APRIL OF 1976, WHEN THE PAKISTANI GOVT MADE A MILLION DOLLAR GIFT TO AFGHANISTAN FOR THE RELIEF OF FLOOD AND EARTHQUAKE VICTIMS. DAOUD MADE PUBLIC HIS LETTER OF APPRECIATION ON APRIL 26 AND WITHIN A WEEK A DE FACTO BAN ON PROPAGANDA WAS INITIATED. ON

MAY 7 KABUL RADIO ANNOUNCED DAOUD'S INSTRUCTION TO HIS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN ISLAMABAD TO INVITE PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO TO VISIT KABUL TO DISCUSS "THE POLITICAL ISSUE THAT SEPARATES US".

BHUTTO'S JUNE 7-11 VISIT HERE, FOLLOWED BY DAOUD'S AUGUST 20-23 VISIT TO PAKISTAN CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE FRANK HOSTILITY OF THE PAST HAS NO PLACE. THE VISITS INITIATED A SERIES OF EVENTS WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY LEAD TOWARD A REAL SENSE OF KINSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND RECOGNITION OF THE MANY WAYS THEIR INTERESTS CONVERGE. THE QUESTION NOW IS WHETHER MOMENTUM CAN BE MAINTAINED, AND WHETHER GENUINE AND LASTING RAPPROCHEMENT WILL BE AN OUTCOME.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF REASONS WHY THIS MIGHT NOT BE THE CASE. IT WOULD BE AN ERROR, WE BELIEVE, TO ATTRIBUTE TO THE TWO NATIONAL LEADERS INVOLVED A "PROBLEM SOLVING" MENTALITY THAT WOULD LEAD THEM INEXORABLY TO WHITTLE AWAY AT THEIR MUTUAL DIFFERENCES (OR "DIFFERENCE", AS THE AFGHANS WOULD HAVE IT), ALL THE BETTER TO RESPOND TO NEWER AND OTHER COMPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL LEADERSHIP DOWN THE PIKE. BOTH DAOUD AND BHUTTO CAN LIKELY LIVE WITH A STATE OF CONSIDERABLE TENSION, AND MIGHT EVEN PREFER TO DO THIS. THE PRESENT SITUATION IS AN AGREEABLE ONE: ACTUAL DANGER OF A CONFLAGRATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAS BEEN MINIMIZED, WITHOUT EITHER LEADER'S HAVING AGREED TO SHUN EXPLOITING A WEAKNESS THAT MIGHT APPEAR IN THE SITUATION OF THE OTHER. GIVEN HIS PRESENT READING OF BHUTTO'S SITUATION DAOUD APPEARS WILLING TO PUT HIS PUSHTUNISTAN PRETENSIONS ON

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 KABUL 00537 02 OF 05 230634Z

LOW HEAT, BUT WERE THE OFT-PREDICTED "BREAKUP OF PAKISTAN" EVER TO TAKE PLACE A BINDING UNDERTAKING TO RESPECT PAKISTAN'S SOVEREIGNTY WOULD BECOME INCONVENIENT.

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PAGE 01 KABUL 00537 03 OF 05 230704Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 5 KABUL 537

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DESPITE THESE FACTORS INHIBITING FULL RAPPROCHEMENT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF HARD PAK-AFGHAN UNDERTAKINGS WHICH, WE BELIEVE, ARE POSSIBLE AND WOULD BE USEFUL IN PRESERVING THE REGIONAL STABILITY THAT THE UNITED STATES DESIRES. EXAMPLES OF THESE MIGHT BE IMPROVED TREATMENT BY THE TWO COUNTRIES OF ONE ANOTHER'S NATIONALS (WHICH APPEARS ALREADY TO HAVE COME ABOUT, ALTHOUGH NOT BY NEW FORMAL AGREEMENTS), RESUMPTION OF AIR LINKS AND INCREASED TRADE AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES. THESE COULD BE FIRM COMMITMENTS THAT WOULD PREVENT INADVERTENT BACKSLIDING AND, PERHAPS, LEAD PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN TOWARD FURTHER ARRANGEMENTS ASSURING IRREVOCABLE GOOD RELATIONS. EACH SUCH AGREEMENT WOULD INVOLVE SOME BULLET-BITING ON BOTH SIDES, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT 1977 WILL SEE SOME OF THESE SMALL STEPS TAKEN.

WE BELIEVE HOWEVER THAT THIS KIND OF PROGRESS IS NOT IN FACT
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PAGE 02 KABUL 00537 03 OF 05 230704Z

AS IMPORTANT AS EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE ALREADY IN 1976. DETENTE IS HERE. THE TWO NATIONAL LEADERS HAVE PUT PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS INTO AN EQUILIBRIUM WHICH IS SAFE AND SATISFACTORY TO BOTH SIDES. ONLY MISCALCULATION OR SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE COMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION OF ONE OF THE TWO COUNTRIES IS LIKELY TO INITIATE A NEW TESTING OF ONE COUNTRY BY THE OTHER. WHILE WE AGREE THAT YET ANOTHER BHUTTO VISIT TO KABUL WOULD

COINCIDE WITH OUR OWN INTEREST IN ENHANCED REGIONAL STABILITY, IT APPEARS TO US HERE THAT STABILITY IS ALREADY ASSURED IN THE SHORT RUN.

3. NON-ALIGNMENT: THE PAST YEAR WAS AN IMPORTANT ONE FOR AFGHAN PARTICIPATION IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. THE KEYSTONE OF AFGHAN FOREIGN POLICY IS "BI-TARAFI" -- LITERALLY "WITHOUT SIDES", AND A CODE WORD HERE TO EXPLAIN ADHERENCE TO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND RATIONALIZE A POLICY WHICH ENABLES AFGHANISTAN TO

ACCEPT EXTENSIVE AID FROM EAST AND WEST WHILE DECLINING TO BE
TIED IN ANY WAY TO EITHER.

PRESIDENT DAOUD ATTENDED THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT AT COLOMBO IN
AUGUST AND WAHEED ABDULLAH ATTENDED THE PRECEDING NON-ALIGNED
FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING. AFGHANISTAN WALKED AWAY FROM
COLOMBO HAVING OBTAINED A SPLIT SHIFT (WITH BANGLADESH) ON THE
NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING COMMITTEE AND, APPARENTLY, HAVING
PLAYED A SOBER ROLE THAT MADE KNOWN ITS DISAPPROVAL OF NON-
ALIGNED HOTHEADS WHILE KEEPING ITS "ANTI-COLONIALIST AND
EXPLOITATIONISTS" CREDENTIALS WELL INTACT. THE YUGOSLAV
FOREIGN MINISTER CAME TO KABUL DURING APRIL OF 1976, AND BOTH
THE INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND INDIA'S PRIME MINISTER
GANDHI CAME DURING JULY. DURING AUGUST IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT
PRESIDENT DAOUD HAD ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO VISIT EGYPT.
THIS ATTENTION TO THE MOVEMENT ASSURES THAT AFGHANISTAN ENTERS
1977 WITH A RESERVOIR OF NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT TO BE DRAWN FOR
THE ASKING.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 KABUL 00537 03 OF 05 230704Z

4. AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA: AFGHANISTAN
EXTENDS CONCEPTS OF "BI-TARAFI" TO INCLUDE ITS RELATIONS WITH
CHINA AS WELL AS WITH THE U.S. AND THE USSR, AND STUDIOUS
EFFORT IS GIVEN TO DEALING CHINA INTO THIS EQUATION. A NEWS-
PAPER WORD COUNT DURING 1976 WOULD REVEAL THAT COVERAGE OF SUCH
MATERIAL AS AID TO AFGHANISTAN BY THE U.S., CHINA AND THE USSR
WAS SPLIT, VOLUME-WISE, SO THAT CHINA RECEIVED FAR MORE
ATTENTION THAN THE LEVEL OF ITS ACTUAL PRESENCE WOULD SEEM TO
REQUIRE. IT IS CLEAR NOW THAT THE AFGHAN GOVT USES CHINA MUCH
IN THE SAME WAY IT USES THE UNITED STATES TO WARD OFF SOVIET
INFLUENCE AND DILUTE SOVIET PREPONDERANCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 KABUL 00537 04 OF 05 230715Z

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 PC-01 OMB-01 TRSE-00 SNM-02
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INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 5 KABUL 537

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

AFGHAN-PAK RAPPROCHEMENT WAS PROBABLY THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT BEARING UPON AFGHAN-SOVIET RELATIONS DURING 1976. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN FACED WITH A POTENTIALLY STRATEGIC SHIFT OF RELATIONSHIPS IN THE AREA WHICH TOUCHES UPON SOVIET EFFORTS TO KEEP AFGHANISTAN AS DEPENDENT AS POSSIBLE UPON THE USSR, AND SOVIET INTEREST IN MAINTAINING AFGHANISTAN AS A PRESSURE POINT AGAINST PAKISTAN. DESPITE THE LACK OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY SOVIET LEADERS IN OPPOSITION TO THIS RAPPROCHEMENT, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS ARE DISQUIETED BY ITS IMPLICATIONS AND ARE FEARFUL OF A POTENTIAL EMERGENCE OF GREATER MUSLIM SOLIDARITY IN THE REGION. (PAK-AFGHAN RAPPROCHEMENT HAS BEEN ONE OF THE KEY GOALS OF THE ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT IN PAST YEARS.) THE SOVIETS ARE PROBABLY WILLING TO WAIT AND SEE IF THE PAK-AFGHAN RAPPROCHEMENT WILL REALLY EMERGE AS A MEANINGFUL AND PERMANENT DEVELOPMENT; IF THE DAMAGE TO SOVIET INTERESTS APPEARS MORE LASTING, WE MIGHT EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO RAISE
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 KABUL 00537 04 OF 05 230715Z

PROBLEMS FOR THE DAOUD GOVT IN RESPONSE. DESPITE THESE INTERNAL, OFF-STAGE RUMBLINGS, SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS DURING 1976 WERE KEPT STUDIOUSLY ON AN EVEN KEEL. THERE WERE NO DRAMATIC OUTWARD SHIFTS OR TURNING.

5. AFGHANISTAN AND THE U.S.: OUR OWN RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN CONTINUED EXCELLENT AND WERE MARKED BY THE RIGHT KIND OF SYMBOLISM, SHOWING U.S. SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE, WHEN PRESIDENT DAOUD'S SPECIAL ENVOY MOHAMMAD NAIM (WHO IS ALSO DAOUD'S BROTHER) VISITED WASHINGTON IN JUNE OF 1976 AND WHEN SECRETARY KISSINGER CAME HERE AUGUST 8. THERE WAS ESTABLISHED A CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE DAOUD REGIME AND THE FORD ADMINISTRATION WHICH DAOUD WILL NO DOUBT WANT TO CREATE WITH THE LEADERS OF OUR NEW ADMINISTRATION. U.S. INTEREST IN REGIONAL STABILITY WAS ADVANCED BY PAK-AFGHAN RAPPROCHEMENT AND WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. GOAL OF INSURING AN AFGHAN GOVT CAPABLE OF SETTING LIMITS UPON THE

INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE COUNTRY WAS FURTHERED BY
PRESIDENT DAOUD'S HANDLING OF BOTH THE COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AND
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

AID PROJECTS EMPHASIZING SIMPLICITY, INCREMENTAL DEVELOPMENT,
DIRECT BENEFITS TO THE POOR, OBJECTIVE AND OBSERVABLE RESULTS
AND AFGHAN COMMITMENT TO PROJECTS CONTINUED TO HELP SPONSOR
THE GENERAL PROSPERITY AND WELL-BEING WE DESIRE FOR AFGHANISTAN.
THE AFGHAN GOVT ALSO APPEARED INCREASINGLY AWARE OF THE PEACE
CORPS MISSION, AND DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO PERMIT THE
PEACE CORPS A GREATER ROLE IN AFGHAN DEVELOPMENT.

A MAJOR CONTRACT WAS SIGNED BETWEEN THE AFGHAN GOVT AND A
U.S. FIRM, WHICH WE CONSIDER A BREAKTHROUGH ON THE COMMERCIAL
FRONT. IN THE NARCOTICS FIELD THE AFGHAN GOVT SHOWED INCREASING
DETERMINATION TO SUPPRESS NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICK-
ING. THIS ACCORDS WITH ENCOURAGEMENT WE HAVE GIVEN THE AFGHAN
GOVT IN THIS FIELD.

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PAGE 03 KABUL 00537 04 OF 05 230715Z

AT THE UNITED NATIONS AFGHANISTAN CAST A DISAPPOINTING VOTE
ON A RESOLUTION DENIGRATING THE U.S. MILITARY POSITION ON
GUAM. THE EMBASSY FORMALLY EXPRESSED OUR DISSATISFACTION OVER
THIS.

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PAGE 01 KABUL 00537 05 OF 05 230750Z

ACTION NEA-10

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PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 5 OF 5 KABUL 537

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

6. RELATIONS WITH IRAN: IF AFGHANISTAN HAD AN OFF YEAR IN ANY OF ITS FOREIGN RELATIONS THIS OCCURRED WITH IRAN, AS THE BLOOM OF EARLIER IRANIAN ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS FADED AND HISTORIC DIFFERENCES AND CULTURAL DIS-AFFINITIES REASSERTED THEMSELVES. IN AMPLY PRAISING TURKISH AND LIBYAN EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, WHILE IGNORING THE SHAH'S NOT INCONSIDERABLE EFFORTS TOWARD THIS END, DAOUD DEMONSTRATED A CALLOUSNESS TOWARD IRAN'S RULER WHICH, CALCULATED OR NOT, WILL HARDLY IMPROVE AFGHAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS. LIKEWISE, GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AFGHAN MEDIA FAILED TO MARK THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY. AFGHANS WERE SLOW TO PRESENT DATA REGARDING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS TO BE FUNDED BY IRAN AND THE IRANIANS RETALIATED BY DELAYING FUNDS. AT SOME POINT DURING THE YEAR AFGHANISTAN "DISCOVERED" THAT A TREATY WITH IRAN CONCERNING THE HELMAND RIVER WATERS HAD, AFTER ALL, BEEN RATIFIED RATHER THAN SCUTTLED, AS EVERYONE CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 KABUL 00537 05 OF 05 230750Z

BELIEVED, BY THE DAOUD COUP D'ETAT IN JULY OF 1973. THE AFGHAN GOVT CONFIDED THIS DISCOVERY HOWEVER ONLY TO THE IRANIANS AND DECLINED TO PUBLICIZE IT BEFORE AFGHANISTAN'S POPULATION -- LEADING THE IRANIANS TO SAY NO TO THE GAME AND PUTTING A HELMAND SETTLEMENT BACK INTO THE SAME MURKY SITUATION WHICH HAS EXISTED FOR YEARS. THE HELMAND WATERS WERE CLOUDED EVEN FURTHER BY DISPUTES OVER JOINT PROJECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOWER PART OF THE VALLEY. THERE WAS IRRITATION ALSO OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF OFFICIALS AT THE AFGHAN-IRANIAN BORDER, AND PROBLEMS OVER ILLEGAL EMIGRATION FROM AFGHANISTAN INTO IRAN. ALTOGETHER, 1976 WAS DISAPPOINTING -- FOLLOWING STEADY AFGHAN-IRANIAN PROGRESS DURING 1974-75 -- AND THE YEAR LEFT OFFICIALS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH A NUMBER OF UNRESOLVED BILATERAL ISSUES.

7. OTHER AREAS: ONCE AGAIN AFGHANISTAN DID A GOOD JOB OF STITCHING ON THE FABRIC OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD. IT ENJOYS GOOD RELATIONS ALMOST EVERYWHERE. AID CONTINUES TO BE PROMISED AND TO COME FROM A WIDE RANGE OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. IN JANUARY OF 1976 THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER WAS WELCOMED TO KABUL; THE IRQI FOREIGN MINISTER CAME IN FEBRUARY, A REPUBLIC OF KOREA POLITICAL-ECONOMIC MISSION CAME DURING APRIL AND THE BULGARIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER VISITED JUNE 29-JULY 1. AFGHANISTAN FOLLOWED THE CUE

OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY IN RECOGNIZING THE MPLA GOVT OF ANGOLA ON FEBRUARY 12, 1976, AND AGREEMENT WAS GIVEN FOR ACCREDITATION OF A NON-RESIDENT CUBAN AMBASSADOR DURING JULY. THESE GESTURES ARE NOT EXPENSIVE BUT DO CREATE AND EXPAND A KIND OF GENERALIZED GOOD WILL TOWARD AFGHANISTAN WHICH WILL CONTINUE.

WITHIN ITS POLICY OF "BI-TARAFI" AFGHANISTAN IS PREOCCUPIED PROBABLY MORE THAN MOST NATIONS WITH ITS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., THE USSR AND CHINA, AND PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS CONTINUE ALSO TO BE A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION EVEN THOUGH RAPPROCHEMENT SEEMS HERE TO STAY. AFGHANISTAN WILL HARDLY FOMENT A "DYNAMIC" CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KABUL 00537 05 OF 05 230750Z

POLICY TOWARD THE REST OF THE WORLD, BUT IT CAN BE EXPECTED TO FOLLOW TESTED WAYS WHICH HAVE SERVED THE AFGHAN REPUBLIC WELL DURING THESE FIRST YEARS OF EXISTENCE IN MAINTAINING ITS INTERNATIONAL FLEXIBILITY AND IN ATTRACTING AID FROM DONORS. ELIOT

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